The Manufacture and Distribution
of Handguns As an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity
Each year the use of handguns leads to the injuries and deaths
of thousands of individuals as a result of accidents, suicides, and
homicides.1 The court system is left with the question of who will
ultimately bear the costs of the injuries, since legislatures have
generally not addressed the problem. The answer need not be constrained by one's beliefs about the desirability of handguns. The
inquiry is a legal one, possible without degeneration into shrill
rhetoric about the role of handguns in society.
Some injuries and deaths resulting from handguns pose no unusual legal questions. For example, where a handgun manufacturer
either is negligent in the manufacture or distribution of a handgun
or produces a defective handgun, personal injuries or deaths that
result will lead to manufacturer's liability under either negligence
or strict products liability principles. However, many (if not most)
handgun injuries do not result from the manufacturer's negligence
or from a defect in the product. It is this class of injuries-those
resulting from the use of a properly functioning handgun-that
presents the most difficult legal questions, questions made particularly troublesome by the fact that handgun manufacturers inject
into the stream of commerce products intended to facilitate the
infliction of grave personal injury.2 In this respect, the question of

' Accidental handgun deaths occur at a rate of about 200 annually. See David T.
Hardy, Product Liability and Weapons Manufacture, 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 541, 551
(1984). It is not known how many of these accidental deaths would be compensated under
the current application of existing legal rules. Handgun homicides made up about 50 percent of all murders from 1978 to 1981, when murders averaged about 20,000 annually. See
Statistical Abstract of the United States 171 (1985) (table 286). Handgun suicides, while a
significant problem, are not within the scope of the rule advocated by this comment. See
note 151 and accompanying text below. The focus of this comment is on the approximately
10,000 deaths and injuries that are caused by the criminal and accidental use of handguns
every year.
' Some discussions about manufacturers' liability for handgun injuries distinguish inexpensive, small-caliber handguns ("Saturday Night Specials") from other handguns. It is
questionable whether one type of handgun is more frequently used as a weapon in crime
than another. See Steven Brill, Firearm Abuse: A Research and Policy Report 49 (1977).
Furthermore, for the reasons stated in note 106 below, the analysis of this comment applies
to all handguns and not just to Saturday Night Specials.
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the liability of handgun manufacturers differs from the question of
the liability of manufacturers of other commercial products.
One approach to holding manufacturers liable for the injuries
caused by their handguns is to classify a handgun as somehow defective, even if it is mechanically perfect.3 This approach has generally failed in the courts,4 and commentators have agreed that the
law of products liability is inappropriate to deal with injuries
caused by well-made handguns.5
Another strict liability approach attempts to classify the manufacture and distribution of handguns 6 itself as an ultrahazardous
or abnormally dangerous activity. The courts have greeted this approach with little enthusiasm, however, and no commentator has
endorsed it. But the ultrahazardous activity doctrine, when properly understood in its economic and historical contexts, offers a
compelling basis for holding handgun manufacturers and distributors strictly liable for many personal injuries caused by handguns.
This comment begins with an economic analysis of the application of strict liability to handgun manufacturers and distributors. It demonstrates the superiority of the strict liability rule over
a negligence standard for maximizing social welfare in certain
types of activities, including an abnormally dangerous activity such
as handgun manufacture and distribution. The comment next discusses the historical development of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine and its current formulation. The discussion shows
that the manufacture and distribution of handguns is properly
classified as abnormally dangerous and that placing liability on the
manufacturer and distributor is the better of two imperfect alter-

3 See, e.g., Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F.Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
4 See id. But consider Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143
(1985) (holding manufacturers strictly liable for the sale of Saturday Night Specials, not
under products liability, but under a new niche of strict liability).
1 See, e.g., Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1912 (1984). But
contrast Comment, A Shot at Stricter Controls: Strict Liability for Gun Manufacturers, 15
Pac. L. J. 171 (1983) (no significant barrier to application of products liability doctrines to
manufacturers of snubnose handguns).
' The phrase "manufacture and distribution of handguns" refers to the original manufacture and the subsequent distribution of handguns to consumers by that manufacturer or
downstream entities; it is treated throughout this comment as a collective noun. Manufacturing alone is too narrow since without the subsequent distribution of handguns no handguns ever would enter the public domain. In 1979, sixteen manufacturers accounted for 96.5
percent of all nonmilitary U.S. handgun production. Pete Shields, Guns Don't Die-People
Do 41 (1981) (citing data of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). The federal government had approximately 158,000 licensed dealers in wholesale and retail firearms in 1981.
Id. at 182 (citing data of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). It is unclear how many

of these dealers traded in handguns.
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natives. Finally, the comment distinguishes the manufacture and
distribution of handguns from the manufacture and distribution of
other consumer products and suggests solutions to potential
problems in implementing strict liability against handgun manufacturers and distributors.

I.

THE ECONOMICS OF HANDGUN INJURIES

This section analyzes the costs and benefits of applying strict
liability against manufacturers and distributors of handguns. It
first examines the activities for which strict liability is a more efficient rule than negligence and then demonstrates that the manufacture and distribution of handguns is among these activities.
A. The Rule of Strict Liability
Liability rules fall into three general categories: negligence,
strict liability, and no liability.7 The common law choice of one of
these rules was often determined by the judges' individualized perceptions of justice. Because the concept of "justice" is subjective
and ethereal, modern courts and commentators have looked for alternative justifications for choosing a particular liability rule. Economic analysis has surfaced as a leading methodology informing
8
the choice of liability rules.
The costs of accidents remain on the victims unless shifted by
a liability rule. Thus, in the absence of such a rule, the costs of
accidents are not included in the injurers' decision-making criteria.
Imposing liability internalizes those costs-forces injurers to consider them-and thus prima facie increases efficiency. However,
these external costs are not the only factors that should be focused
upon in assessments of economic efficiency. Efficiency requires
I Intentional torts can be seen as embodying a fourth liability rule, requiring a unique
standard of culpable conduct (intent) before liability will ensue. The economic literature,
however, does not treat this rule independently, probably because liability for intentional
torts is generally subsumed within negligence liability. The only instance in which a defendant would be liable for an intentional tort but not for negligence would be when the intentional commission of a tortious act was reasonable-presumably a small and relatively unimportant category of cases. Consideration of the law of intentional torts as an independent
liability rule is hereafter omitted from the discussion.

s Leading judicial examples include United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947) (applying negligence formula through weighing expected costs of accident
against costs of avoidance); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944) (choosing strict liability rather than negligence on grounds of optimal risk
allocation). Leading academic discussions include Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973).
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maximizing the net benefits of joint activities. 9 Unless the conduct
of the victim is wholly independent of the function defining frequency and severity of the accident, the conduct of the victim
should also be taken into account in fashioning liability rules.
The conduct of injurers and victims breaks down into two
components: the standard of care and the level of activity.'0 Because of the difficulty of ascertaining optimal activity levels in individual cases, judges in applying a given liability rule in a case
generally only consider the standard of care."- But when the question is not whether there is liability under a given rule, but rather
which liability rule should apply, the failure to consider activity
levels may become excessively costly.
The level of activity is, essentially, the frequency with which
given parties engage in conduct that creates a risk of harm. The
concept applies equally to the injured, to the injurer, and to any
other party who could be said to constitute a "but for" cause of the
threatened accident. Consider, for example, the two-party paradigm of a person who decides to drive to the store for a candy bar
and a pedestrian who crosses the road on his way to a movie. Assume that even though both parties exercise due care, the driver
hits the pedestrian. Given that the accident could not have been
prevented with reasonable care, who should bear the cost of the
accident? Should the driver have foregone her candy bar, or should
the pedestrian have missed the movie-that is, which actor should
have curtailed her activity in this marginal case? The short answer
is: the person whose conduct would have led to the greatest reduction in overall costs.
The problem is that no matter which liability rule obtains, one
of the parties will engage in too much activity. For example, if negligence is the rule, the pedestrian will bear the loss in our hypothetical accident. Thus, the driver will not consider the costs of a
nonnegligent accident when deciding to drive to the candy store,
because those costs are external to her. As a result, even if she does
not want the candy very much, she will take the trip if the benefit
she receives from the candy outweighs her costs in time, gasoline,
and the price of the candy. But if she had to consider the costs of
I

See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).

10 For general background, see Shavell, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (cited in note 8).

11 Modification of the negligence rule to include explicit recognition of activity levels
would solve this problem. It is questionable, however, whether courts are equipped to make
effective judgments about activity levels. See Comment, A Time-Dependent Model of Products Liability, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 218-20 (1986).
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the accident, in the marginal case she might stay at home and have
cookies instead.
On the other hand, if strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is the prevailing rule, the driver bears the costs of
the nonnegligent accident, and those costs will be external to the
injured pedestrian to the extent the liability rule compensates him
for the injury. The pedestrian thus will walk to the movie, even if
he has already seen it, when if he had to bear the cost of a nonnegligent accident, he might (in the marginal case) stay home and
watch T.V.
The optimal activity level, then, is the one at which each actor
considers the cost of nonnegligent accidents in deciding whether to
engage in conduct that may be a but-for cause of an accident. This
internalization of costs is the function of liability rules. The choice
between the strict liability rule with contributory negligence
(sometimes called the modified strict liability rule) and the negligence rule, from the standpoint of efficiency, will depend on
whether it is more effective to control the injurer's activity or the
12
victim's activity.
Neither rule leads to a generally efficient result, because
neither considers activity levels; each examines only the standard
of care.13 Under negligence, all levels of the injurer's nonnegligent
activity escape liability, but only those levels that produce benefits
greater than the increased accident costs they engender are efficient. Similarly, under the modified strict liability rule, victims'
nonnegligent activity levels will continue even when the additional
activity reduces social welfare. The flaw in both regimes derives
from the failure of courts to account for the declining marginal social utility of an activity.
Nonetheless, both rules are superior to no liability or to strict
liability without the defense;1 4 and in most cases one rule will be
better than the other. Strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence is superior to the negligence rule if injurer activity
contributes more to social loss than does victim activity.1 5 Conversely, if victim activity contributes more to social loss, the negligence rule is appropriate.
According to both Richard Posner and Steven Shavell, the
" See

Shavell, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 19 (cited in note 8).

3 Id. at 19-25. See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 139-40 (2d ed.

1977).
" Shavell, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 19 (cited in note 8) (Proposition 4).
15 See Comment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 218-20 (cited in note 11).
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above analysis helps explain the rule of strict liability in certain
areas of the tort law, among them cases of ultrahazardous activity."6 Given that a choice between the negligence rule or the modified strict liability rule is one between the lesser of two evils, 7 the
optimal rule depends on the positions of the victims and injurers.
The less significant the effect of internalization of accident costs on
victim activity levels and the less significant the effect of victim
activity levels on accident costs, the greater the efficiency of the
strict liability rule."8
In the traditional categories of "ultrahazardous activities," victims' activities are often "entirely routine in nature, part of what it
is to carry on a normal life.""' In contrast, an injurer's ultrahazardous activity usually possesses distinctive aspects that allow the law to single out such activity.2 0 Victim conduct-just
plain living-would not change much as a result of liability, while
injurer conduct-unique and unusual-would respond to liability.
Posner argues that in cases of ultrahazardous activities, potential
victims are not in a good position to make adjustments to their
behavior that might eventually reduce or eliminate the risk of injury.2 ' For this reason, imposing strict liability on the injurer will
control such activity better than, and will create greater gains in
social welfare than, the negligence rule. The economic model, then,
justifies the strict liability rule with contributory negligence for
cases of ultrahazardous activities. This is approximately the com22
mon law rule.
16 Posner, Economic Analysis at 140-41 (cited in note 13); Shavell, 9 J. Legal Stud. at
24-25 (cited in note 8).
'7Shavell, 9 J. Legal Stud. at 19 (cited in note 8).
"SFor certain types of ultrahazardous activities, such as creating a sonic boom, victims'

conduct will have virtually no bearing on accident costs. In such a case strict liability is
unambiguously the most efficient rule. See id. at 2-3. Other ultrahazardous activities, such
as trucking explosives, reflect victims' activity levels to the extent that the more automobiles on the road when the miscarriage occurs, the greater the cost of the accident. The
negligence rule would place the loss on these victims without necessarily deterring their
future automobile trips generally. The strict liability rule, on the other hand, forces even the
nonnegligent trucker to consider the expected accident cost of each trip, assuring that the
trip will be made only if the benefits exceed the total social cost.
19 Id. at 24.
20 Id.
21 Posner, Economic Analysis at 140-41 (cited in note 13).
22 The abnormally dangerous activities doctrine as formulated by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts bars recovery for plaintiffs where there is either assumption of risk or
contributory negligence when the risk is known; contributory negligence with respect to failure to discover the risk is not a defense. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 523-24, § 524
comment a (1977). A plaintiff's unusual sensitivity to an otherwise abnormally dangerous
activity will also bar recovery under the rule. Id. § 524A.
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As noted at the outset, current liability rules compensate victims for injuries resulting from the negligence of a handgun manufacturer or distributor or from a defect in the handgun itself. For
all other injuries and deaths, victims or their estates cannot recover from handgun manufacturers or distributors. This section argues that the current negligence regime for the manufacture and
distribution of handguns is inappropriate. Using the economic
analysis concerning the optimal control of activity levels,2 3 it concludes that strict liability is the proper rule, since it is the manufacturers' and distributors' activity levels that are most costly if
uncontrolled.
The noncriminal activities of handgun victims are essentially
those of everyday living.24 To refrain from one activity necessarily
requires the participation in another with similar risk. While the
exact degree of risk of handgun injury may change as the victim
moves from activity to activity, the change in risk is likely to be
small, and the victim probably cannot significantly reduce the risk
at reasonable cost. To be sure, the victim could quit his job or barricade himself, alone, in his house. But such safety measures
would, at a systematic level, prove more costly than the injuries
they prevented and so would be inefficient. In other words, the desire to engage in employment and (arguably) the desire to live in a
home that is not barricaded are relatively inelastic. If such activities are made to bear the cost of handgun injuries, the activities
and thus the injury costs will continue at nearly the same level, or
victims will substitute alternative activities with substantially the
same risk of handgun injury. Moreover, as a matter of policy, society might not wish to do anything to deter these normal, everyday
activities.
Even if victim behavior did change dramatically, it probably
would not create costs comparable to those currently created by
manufacturers' and distributors' behavior. Nonnegligent victim ac23 In applying this analysis, one must consider, for both victim and injurer, the likely
activity level of both parties under a given rule and the statistical effect those activity levels
should have on accident costs.
2 Victims who use guns legally in the course of their livelihoods, such as policemen
and security guards, are a special class. Their decisions to enter such a field, and decisions
made during the course of their work, naturally heighten the risk of handgun injury. The
positions of these victims are analytically similar to those of handgun owners, discussed
below at notes 144-47 and accompanying text. This class of victims would not recover under
the proposed liability rule.

376
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tivity, even viewed cumulatively, cannot possibly have a correlation to shooting injuries approaching that of the manufacture and
distribution of certain kinds of handguns (as a proportion of the
value of the activity). Marginal victim activity would be much less
wasteful than is marginal injurer activity.
Yet it is unlikely that victims would dramatically increase
their participation in risky activities if they no longer had to bear
the cost of nonnegligent handgun injury. This is so not only because of the nature of victim conduct, but also because a legal remedy does not eliminate a victim's incentive to avoid a handgun accident. Few people view a money judgment as perfect
compensation for grave physical injury or death. Furthermore, at
some point victim conduct becomes contributorily negligent and
bars recovery.
Manufacturers, on the other hand, are likely to respond more
directly and substantially to facing liability than victims respond
to the presence or absence of a legal remedy. Their marginal cost
curves shift upward in an amount equal to the cost of handgun
accidents at each level of production (activity). Under a strict liability regime, manufacturers will face a higher marginal cost curve
and will correspondingly charge higher prices. Assuming any
nonzero price elasticity of demand for handguns, consumers will
buy fewer handguns, since some who would have bought a handgun before will not find it worth the extra price. To the extent that
the risk of uncompensated injury to a third-party constitutes a real
cost of the handgun in the consumer's hands, the consumer's decision not to pay this cost in the price is welfare maximizing since it
reflects the fact that the consumer's benefit from having the gun is
less than society's benefit from his not having it.
Of course, handguns are only one category of firearms in general, and the handgun market itself is fairly differentiated: some
owners use handguns for legitimate, low-risk purposes. At the
point of sale or before, the manufacturer or salesperson may not be
able to tell which buyer will use the handgun to inflict otherwise
uncompensated injury on a victim (and consequently inflict liability on the manufacturer) and which buyer will use the handgun for
purely legitimate purposes. Unless the market is sufficiently differentiated or alternative pricing mechanisms exist, the manufacturer
must spread the risk evenly across the product, charging the average cost of liability to each gun. The inevitable result is that some
customers who would have used the gun for legitimate purposes
will be deterred from purchase by the higher price. These customers miss out on the benefit of gun ownership, and yet their forbear-
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ance saves no uncompensated accident costs. The result is social
loss.
On the other hand, some people deterred from handgun
purchases would have inflicted massive uncompensated injury;
keeping guns from them creates social gain. Thus, whether or not
discouraging handgun purchases will create net social gain depends
on how accurately the manufacturer can estimate the actual risks
of a sale and what other options are available to "priced-out"
consumers.
There are reasons, however, to think that the handgun market
is sufficiently differentiated so that prices and hence activity levels
will eventually reflect the risks associated with the sale of each gun
of a certain type. Handguns come in a variety of designs, in many
degrees of quality, and at many prices. Some are more appropriate
for sport, some for military or police work, and some appear best
suited for criminal use 25 or for self-defense. Moreover, handguns
are sold in a number of markets, such as to the military, the police,
private users, and dealerships.
The more injuries a particular type of handgun causes, the
more a strict liability rule will increase the price and reduce the
quantity demanded of that type of gun. Consequently, the portion
of the manufacturer's production that is least efficient will be affected most; the guns that cause the most net loss will show the
sharpest declines in quantities sold once social cost is included in
the price. Likewise, handguns that are safer, or because of type,
price, or selective marketing are rarely used in a way that externalizes the cost of injuries, would experience a smaller increase in
price and a smaller decline in sales. No doubt, substitution among
handgun models would occur, but manufacturers (and their insurers) can anticipate this and change prices and production levels
accordingly.
Furthermore, the manufacturer is not bound to take the market as he finds it; he may reduce the risk of handgun injuries by
adjusting his designs and marketing practices. For example, he
may reduce the number of accidental injuries caused by his product by imposing a minimum age for purchase or by requiring NRA
training, and he may reduce the number of intentionally inflicted
injuries by extending the barrel of his handguns to make them less
concealable or by refusing sales to identifiably high-risk people.
Strict liability increases his incentives to do so. In short, under
11

See notes 105-07 and accompanying text below.
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strict liability a large amount of inefficient handgun production activity would be averted, producing net social gain.
To be sure, manufacturers'liability is not the exclusive means
for internalizing costs more fully. The purchaser or the user of the
handgun could also be subjected to strict liability. Then, when the
consumer decided to buy or use a gun, the expected cost of liability-which under strict liability is all accident costs caused by the
handgun-would become part of his cost of purchase or use. The
higher effective cost of the handgun to purchasers and users would
26
lead to lower consumption, that is, reduced injurer activity levels.
Even if the purchaser and user were not the same person, the liability rule would limit the market to an efficient number of
handguns.
Thus, strict liability against purchasers and users likely would
be more efficient than the current system, under which they are
liable for only intentionally or negligently caused injuries. Strict
liability against purchasers and users might produce even greater
efficiency gains than strict liability against manufacturers and distributors, since the former have more control over and information
about the risk of handgun injuries.
However, strict liability against purchasers and users breaks
down in many cases for two reasons. First, when an injury occurs,
it may be impossible to identify the purchaser or user, particularly
if he is a criminal who fled the scene of the crime. Second, even
when identification is possible, the purchaser or user is often judgment proof.27 This poses a "moral hazard" problem: even if consumers could accurately assess the frequency and severity of handgun injuries, they would not consider the full expected social cost
in their purchase decisions since they would not expect to pay it.
On the other hand, imposing strict liability on manufacturers and
distributors would present no insurmountable problems of identifi26 A retail tax would achieve the same result on the demand side as strict manufacturers' liability. Congress has apparently adopted this (partial) solution to the problem of externalities in alcohol consumption. Only if this handgun tax were high enough and were
used to compensate victims (and not just to increase general revenues) would the result be
equivalent to strict manufacturers' liability. Furthermore, such a solution requires explicit
legislation, whereas the solution advocated by this comment applies existing legal doctrine.
27 See Decker v. Gibson Products Co. of Albany, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 34, 37 (M.D. Ga.
1980), rev'd, 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982). A rule requiring handgun purchasers and users
to carry insurance could ameliorate this problem. Insurance companies may be even better
able to monitor injurer behavior than manufacturers and distributors. But criminals are
unlikely to acquire insurance. In any case, mandatory insurance would require legislation
and would be difficult to enforce at the individual level.
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cation or financial responsibility.2 8 Accordingly, strict liability
against handgun manufacturers and distributors is optimal in limiting handgun purchases to an efficient level.
Placing strict liability on manufacturers and distributors
would not remove intervening tortfeasors' disincentives to engage
in harmful conduct. If the handgun user or owner can be identified
and is not judgment proof, he should be liable to the manufacturer
or distributor for indemnification. Moreover, a person who injures
another person with a handgun will often face criminal prosecution
and the social stigma associated with his crime.
The manufacture and distribution of handguns is not the only
risky activity that creates external costs. What distinguishes this
activity, however, is that the victims' activities cannot be controlled in a meaningful way by allowing the loss to remain on
them; nor can the activities of other injurers, since they are likely
to be unknown or judgment proof. Consequently, the most effective method of controlling excessive harmful activity and thereby
reducing social costs is to place the burden on handgun manufacturers and distributors.
Other considerations of public policy support strict liability in
this context. A common sentiment is that it is more equitable that
those producing guns pay for the injuries they cause than that innocent victims pay.29 In addition, manufacturers and distributors
are better able to spread the risk of handgun injury than are the
victims: thus the familiar strict liability rationale of risk allocation"0 supports such a regime here, too.
II. THE ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS AcTIvITIES DOcTRINE
Strict liability for the manufacture and distribution of handguns rests on a solid legal foundation: the common law tort doctrine that applies strict liability to activities deemed ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous. As noted above, this
doctrine is economically defensible because in ultrahazardous ac28

See notes 152-53 and accompanying text below (on handgun identification). In addi-

tion to this new insurance (which would become an ordinary operating expense), the company has its entire equity as a resource to pay for its costly conduct. It may be necessary to

regulate undercapitalized companies through mandatory liability insurance or minimum
capital levels, since otherwise these companies will have incentives to engage in overly risky

activity. See note 155 and accompanying text below.
29 First-party insurance helps to compensate victims but does nothing to reduce the
activity levels of injurers. Only insofar as purchasers bear the cost of insurance will a drop in
injurer activity levels result.
30 See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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tivities, controlling injurer, rather than victim, activity levels is
more effective in reducing total costs. For the same reason, manufacturer's strict liability is a superior rule for handgun injuries.
The similar economic justifications suggest that the manufacture
and distribution of handguns may properly be classified as an ultrahazardous activity. And, indeed, handgun manufacture and distribution falls squarely within the criteria for applying the common law doctrine.
This section first traces the evolution of the ultrahazardous activities doctrine into the current doctrine of abnormally dangerous
3
activities, embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 1 It
then examines the doctrine's applicability to the manufacture and
distribution of consumer products in general, setting the stage for
the next section, which applies the doctrine to handgun manufacturers and distributors.
A.

Historical Development

The doctrine of ultrahazardous activities originated in the famous case of Rylands v. Fletcher.32 The rule of the case, as it
emerged from subsequent English decisions, is that the defendant
will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained, in light of the character of that place and its surroundings.3 3 Early confusion about what the case actually stood for led
to varying degrees of acceptance by the American courts.3 4 But
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ("Second Restatement").
Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd L.R. 1 Ex. 265
(1866), aff'd as Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
33 See W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen, Prosser
and Keeton on the Law of Torts 547-48 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser and Keeton on Torts"). See
also Abraham Harari, The Place of Negligence in the Law of Torts 147-51 (1962); William
Lloyd Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 147 (1953) ("Selected Topics").
" The confusion arose because of Baron Blackburn's comments in the Exchequer
Chamber, which premised liability on the broader principle that strict liability applies to all
those who bring and keep on their land any thing likely to do mischief if that thing escapes.
See Prosser, Selected Topics at 137 (cited in note 33).
Lord Cairns had limited the basis of liability to "nonnatural" uses, but American courts
often overlooked this qualification, which possibly explains the inconsistent treatment.
Within eight years of the final English decision, five American courts had registered their
own evaluations of the rule: Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868) (adopting the rule); Cahill v.
Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872) (adopting the rule); Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873)
(rejecting the rule); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (rejecting the rule); and Marshall
v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876) (rejecting the rule). "Rylands v. Fletcher was treated as
holding that the defendant is absolutely liable in all cases whenever anything under his
control escapes and does damage. In other words, the law of the case was misstated, and as
misstated rejected, on facts to which it had no proper application in the first place." Prosser
',

32
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once it was adopted in America, the doctrine developed beyond the
English rule.
A significant manifestation of the unique flavor of the American rule came with the first Restatement of Torts, which attempted to codify the principles of the Rylands-type cases under
the heading of "ultrahazardous activities." According to the Restatement, an activity is ultrahazardous when it "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care,"3 5 and where the activity "is not a matter of common usage." 6 This formulation differed from the pure English rule in not
directly considering the relation of the activity to its surroundings,
in requiring extreme dangerousness in the activity, and in3 exempt7
ing activities where due care would eliminate the danger.
It is not clear that the American cases dealing with the ultrahazardous activity doctrine supported the Restatement formulation.38 The early cases had involved related doctrines that played
roles in the rule's genesis-trespass, strict liability for dangerous
animals, and nuisance"'-and often it was not possible to discern
the boundaries between those bases for liability and the Rylands
doctrine itself. The Restatement formulation attempted to develop
a rule that stated the principle of Rylands in light of those related
bodies of strict liability. Thus it is not surprising to find a dearth
of case law support for its specific formulation of the rule. In any
case, whether the Restatement got it right is now less important
than its impact on subsequent cases.
The underlying rationale for the rule initially was one of public policy: where an actor introduces into the community an unusual risk, she (rather than a wholly innocent victim) should pay
for the cost of accidents attributable to the risk, regardless of due
care. 40 However, some courts were uncomfortable with the idea of
and Keeton on Torts at 548 (cited in note 33).
3' Restatement of Torts § 520(a) (1938).
3' Id. at § 520(b).
37 Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 551 (cited in note 33). See also Prosser, Selected
Topics at 158 (cited in note 33).
" Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 551 (cited in note 33).
31 For general background, see Prosser, Selected Topics at 137-49 (cited in note 33).
0 See Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 560, 574-75,
54 N.E. 528, 531 (1899); Kall v. Carruthers, 59 Cal.App. 555, 211 P. 43 (1922); Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333-34, 270 P. 952, 955 (1928). See also Spano v.
Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 17-18, 250 N.E.2d 31, 35 (1969) (discussing earlier cases and the
rationale for liability); Chavez v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 413 F.Supp. 1203, 1207-08
(E.D. Cal. 1976).
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strict liability, fearing it would overly burden defendants and inhibit commerce and industrialization."
Despite the problems courts have had in applying the rule-an
unclear understanding of its parameters, a suspicion of strict liability in general, and the concern for protecting commercial development-a wide variety of activities have been held to fall within the
rule. Blasting cases are ubiquitous; 42 the storage and transporta44
tion of gasoline'4 and the storage and transportation of explosives
are also activities that frequently fall within the rule. Other activities considered ultrahazardous include fumigating with hydrogen
47
cyanide,'4 5 cropdusting, 46 releasing fluorine gas in manufacturing,
creating sonic booms,'48 pile driving,4' transporting liquefied propane gas,50 and rocket launching.5 1 There are, not surprisingly, also
52
cases whose facts resemble those in Rylands.
The next significant step in the development of the ultrahazardous activities doctrine was the reformulation adopted in
1977 by the Second Restatement. The Second Restatement refined
the previous view by listing six factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous," the new la41 See City Water Power Co. v. City of Fergus Falls, 113 Minn. 33, 35-36, 128 N.W. 817,
818 (1910); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934); Fritz v. DuPont
Co., 45 Del. 427, 437-38, 75 A.2d 256, 261 (1950). See also Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., Inc.,
399 So.2d 248 (Ala. 1981) (majority rationalizes the doctrine in terms of negligence, dissent
focuses on dire implications of the rule for commerce).
42 See, e.g., Correa v. Curbey, 124 Ariz. 480, 605 P.2d 458 (App. 1979); M.W. Worley
Constr. Co. v. Hungerford, Inc., 215 Va. 377, 210 S.E.2d 161 (1974); Davis v. L & W Constr.
Co., 176 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1970); Catholic Welfare Guild, Inc. v. Brodney Corp., 58 Del.
246, 208 A.2d 301 (Super. Ct. 1964).
4' As to storage of gasoline, see City of Northglenn, Colo. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 519
F.Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981); Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969). As to
transportation of gasoline, see, e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181
(1972) (implicitly refusing to apply the common carrier exception as articuleted by the Second Restatement § 521). But contrast Ozark Indus., Inc. v. Stubbs Transports, Inc., 351
F.Supp. 351 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Collins v. Liquid Transporters, 262 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1953).
4 As to storage of explosives, see Koster & Wythe v. Massey, 293 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1961) (incendiary bomb); Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206
(Alaska 1978). But contrast Bridges v. Kentucky Stone Co., Inc., 425 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. 1981).
As to transportation of explosives, see, e.g., Chavez, 413 F.Supp. at 1203.
45 Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
46 Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961).
4 Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 438 P.2d 674 (Mont. 1968). But contrast
Fritz, 75 A.2d at 256.
4'8 Nelms v. Laird, 442 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1971).
4' Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 194 N.W.2d 767
(1971).
50 National Steel Serv. Center v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1982).
8 Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal.App.2d 774, 56 Cal.Rptr. 128 (1967).
52 Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876 (1975).
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bel for what the First Restatement called "ultrahazardous":
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."
These factors restore the consideration of location, which was
missing from the previous formulation, and flesh out issues considered by the courts as inherent in the old formulation.5 The impact
of these changes is unclear. One commentator suggests that this
test is now akin to the negligence standard,5 5 another commentator
heralds the return to a flexible standard,5 6 and one court has called
the formulation
influential in "extending the ambit of strict
57
liability.

B. The Abnormally Dangerous Activities Doctrine and the
Manufacture of Consumer Products
Classifying the manufacture and distribution of handguns as
an abnormally dangerous activity would be an extension of past
doctrine. It would make the production of a consumer product the
basis for liability, while most cases decided under the doctrine
have predicated liability on use of a product. For example, it is the
contractor and not the manufacturer who is liable for accidents in
the use of explosives, and it is the carrier and not the producer
53 Second

Restatement § 520.
Since nearly all ultrahazardous activities relate somehow to land use, the locational
element-though not explicitly mentioned in older formulations of the rule-was ever-present in the cases. The Second Restatement reflects this in factor (e). Factor (f), the value to
the community, reflects the common law courts' interest in the adverse effects of a rule of
strict liability on industry. Factors (a) and (b) together specify the meaning of "risk of serious harm" under the old formulation.
11 See Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 555 (cited in note 33).
5 See Comment, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprises: Returning to a Flexible
Analysis, 9 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 67, 75-82 (1979).
17 City of Northglenn, 519 F.Supp. at 516.
54
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who is liable for a gasoline spill.
Certainly manufacture and distribution separately are "activities"-just as much as any other steps in the process of injecting a
product into the stream of commerce and human activity. Thus,
when critics object to characterizing these as ultrahazardous activities," they must argue that production and distribution are not
ultrahazardous. And indeed, one might reason that while the use of
a product might be ultrahazardous, its manufacture is not inherently dangerous and so should fall outside the doctrine.
Nevertheless, there is authority for characterizing the manufacture and distribution of a dangerous consumer product as an
ultrahazardous activity. In Chapman Chemical Company v. Taylor,5 9 the defendant chemical company produced a pesticide,
known as 2-4-D, that unexpectedly had the propensity to float
great distances. The chemical was harmful to cotton and damaged
the plaintiff's crop. Although the trial court characterized as "negligent"6 0 the defendant's failure to fully test this "inherently dangerous" product, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on a
theory of strict liability, citing the First Restatement and several
cases based on the doctrine of ultrahazardous activities:
[H]ere we are dealing with an extra hazardous chemical
known to be highly dangerous....
If one casts into the air a substance which he knows may
do damage to others . . . principles of elementary justice
[and] the best public policy require that . . . if he releases
such a substance. . . in indifference to the damage that may
be done, the rule of strict liability should be applied. 1
In essence, the court held the manufacturerresponsible for "casting into the air" this harmful pesticide because it had sold the
2
dangerous product.
58

See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.

1984).

, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).

60 222 S.W.2d at 826.
61 Id. at 826-27.
62 Language in the opinion points to the company's failure to test for the floating char-

acteristics of the pesticide as a factor in the issue of liability. Although this suggests a
breach of duty, it is actually a red herring. The court makes clear that the company would
be "charged with the knowledge which tests would have revealed." Id. at 827. Had the company actually made the tests, discovered this characteristic, and still sold the product, according to the court's reasoning liability would necessarily have followed. Perhaps the company may have avoided liability by introducing the pesticide with an adequate warning; the
important point here is that the court was willing to hold a manufacturer liable on a theory
of ultrahazardous activities.

1987]

Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns

Other cases involving dangerous products also entertain the
possibility of manufacturers' strict liability under the abnormally
dangerous activities doctrine. In response to a claim that the manufacture of an investigational drug was an abnormally dangerous
activity, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that "traditionally"
the doctrine contemplated some notion of "geographic proximity"
and declined an "innovative application" of the doctrine because
production of the particular drug did not involve sufficiently great
or unusual risks 3 and because the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the risk.6 4 In a similar challenge to the marketing of chemically treated grain, a New Mexico court analyzed whether the activity satisfied the Restatement factors. The court ruled that the
grain treatment involved was of common usage and that due care
would have eliminated the danger. 5
A case of special interest is IndianaHarbor Belt Railroad Co.
v. American Cyanamid Co. 6 There the plaintiffs sued American
Cyanamid as "manufacturer and shipper" of acrylonitrile, a hazardous and toxic substance, when the substance leaked from a railway freight car in transit. The court refused to dismiss the cause of
action based on ultrahazardous activities, stating that the defendant "acted 'for his own purposes and profit' in introducing the
peril into the community. 8' 7 The court looked to an earlier state
case to frame its ultimate inquiry: "Are there products with such
dangerous qualities that they should not be placed in the stream of
commerce; or if so placed that the risk of harm to the public is so
great that liability should be imposed on the manufacturer if harm
befalls one exposed to the product?" 8 The court clearly indicated
liability of the manufacturer was not based on transporting the
acrylonitrile but rather on arrangingfor its transportation. 9 The
court's focus on the role of the manufacturer in injecting the dangerous though nondefective product into the stream of commerce
is a significant recognition of the appropriateness of applying the
abnormally dangerous activities doctrine to manufacturers of dan63 Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 48-49, 588 P.2d 326, 341-42 (1978).

Gaston, 588 P.2d at 341.
45 First Nat. Bank, Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agri. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 79, 537 P.2d
682, 687 (App. 1975). The New Mexico court used the older "ultrahazardous activities"
formulation.
46 517 F.Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
67 Id. at 317.
68 Id. at 318, quoting Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 Ill.App.3d 525, 528,
380 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1978) (products liability case).
69 517 F.Supp. at 318-19 n.3. "The plaintiffs here have only sought to impose liability
upon the manufacturer, who arranged for the acrylonitrile to be transported." Id.
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gerous products generally.
As the discussion of these cases indicates, manufacturers' liability for abnormally dangerous activities may overlap with strict
products liability. This is not surprising, however, given the role
that the ultrahazardous activities doctrine played in the development of strict products liability. 0 If no theory of products liability
had ever evolved, many of the same results might have been
reached by characterizing the distribution of defective products as
an abnormally dangerous activity.7 1 But the availability of strict
products liability has, as a practical matter, preempted this approach for consumer products.
A comment about "common usage" from the Second Restatement further supports application of the doctrine to a manufacturer of a consumer product: "Likewise the manufacture, storage,
transportation and use of high explosives . . . are not matters of
common usage. 712 The storage, transportation, and use of explosives comport with the traditional interpretation of abnormally
dangerous activities;7 3 in including "manufacture" among the activities listed, the Restatement appears to recognize the equal or
dominant role this activity plays in the overall creation of risk.
In practical terms, manufacturers may have eluded liability
for "traditional" ultrahazardous activities simply because plaintiffs
had no need to reach the manufacturers. The intermediate actors-for example, carriers or contractors using dangerous materials-were usually well-heeled entities in and of themselves; plaintiffs thus had little incentive to extend the ultrahazardous doctrine
to a party one step removed. But where the immediate actor is
74
unknown or insolvent, as is often the case with handgun injuries,

70 See, e.g., Cavan v. General Motors Corp., 280 Or. 455, 571 P.2d 1249 (1977) (recognizing the ultrahazardous activities doctrine as a step in the evolution of strict products
liability in Oregon, but stating that the doctrine no longer has applicability in a products
case, having been displaced by Second Restatement § 402A); Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327
F.Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1971) (tracing the development of the ultrahazardous activities doctrine and its interplay with developing products liability law).
71 Apparently the courts have not greeted this characterization with favor. See Handy,
327 F.Supp. at 605 (citing a host of cases that reject the contention, at least as proposed in
those cases). But see Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 726-28, 530 P.2d 53, 67-68
(1974) (Tongue, J., dissenting) (stressing the similarity between an action for injuries caused
by a dangerously defective product and an action for injuries from an ultrahazardous product or condition). There is, however, a significant difference between the activity of distributing products that occasionally cause injury when defective and distributing products that
are always dangerous and that frequently cause" injury.
72 Second Restatement § 520, comment i.

7

Id.

74

See text at notes 27-28 above.
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plaintiffs must search beyond that actor for another responsible
party.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS

ACTIVITIES DOCTRINE TO THE MANUFACTURE AND
DISTRIBUTION OF HANDGUNS

This section shows how the abnormally dangerous activities
doctrine of the Second Restatement can be fruitfully applied to
the manufacture and distribution of handguns. The section first
surveys the case law and commentary on this specific topic. Next,
the section argues that handgun manufacture and distribution generally qualifies as a proximate cause of handgun-related injuries,
since such injuries are foreseeable at the time of production. The
section then examines the factors defining abnormally dangerous
activities and finds that handgun production fits comfortably
within them. It next shows how the reach of the strict liability
principle can be confined to handgun production and distribution
rather than be left to encompass a wide range of "dangerous" activities. The section concludes by discussing the doctrine in
practice.
A.

Cases and Commentary

The only case so far to recognize a cause of action against a
handgun manufacturer or distributor under the abnormally dan75
gerous activities doctrine is Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.
There, the district court interpreted Louisiana law to permit a
wrongful death action under the ultrahazardous activities doctrine
for the rape and murder of the plaintiff's daughter.7 6 The Fifth
Circuit, however, reversed the decision, holding that the action was
prohibited under the peculiar ultrahazardous activities doctrine
developed from the Louisiana civil code."
A few other courts have conscientiously analyzed causes of action against handgun manufacturers based on the abnormally dan-

73 571 F.Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), rev'd as Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1985).
76 571 F.Supp. at 208-09.
77 762 F.2d at 1254-69, discussing the ultrahazardous activities doctrine developed from
La. Civ. Code Annot. arts. 667-69 (West 1980). The lower court had held that the cause of
action was permitted under the Second Restatement. 571 F.Supp. at 208-09. The court of
appeals added in dicta that it believed the plaintiff would fail under the Restatement as
well. 762 F.2d at 1265 n.43.
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gerous doctrine,7 but none of these have allowed the action to
stand. The courts have pointed to several perceived shortcomings
in the application of the ultrahazardous activities doctrine to
handgun manufacturers. Most frequently, courts distinguish the
use of a handgun from its marketing,7 9 arguing that while the use
of a handgun might be an ultrahazardous activity, the marketing
of such an item is not particularly dangerous.8 0 Courts also have
objected to the characterization of a sale of a product as an activity, l the move away from the doctrine's traditional relation to
land use, 2 and the application of the "common usage" criterion to
the handgun's marketing. 83
These objections are hollow in light of a full understanding of
the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities. The distinction
between marketing and use is one without a difference,8 4 the relation to land use is but a proxy for the totality of the circumstances,8 and the manufacture of handguns is not of common us6
age even if owning a handgun might be.
Two other criticisms of the application of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine to the manufacture and distribution of
handguns are: 1) that application to handguns logically will lead to
the application of the doctrine to manufacturers of other products,
such as of kitchen knives, automobiles, tobacco products, and liquor; 87 and 2) that extending liability rules in a situation as pub78 See Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Riordan v. Int'l. Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Kelley v. R. G.
Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or.
55, 704 P.2d 118 (1985).
7' See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1265 n.43; Martin, 743 F.2d at 1203-06; Burkett, 704 P.2d at
121-22; Riordan, 477 N.E.2d at 1297.
:0 See, e.g, Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204.
1'Id. This decision ignored an earlier opinion within its own circuit (which had applied

the same state's law), Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 517 F.Supp. 314, discussed above at text
accompanying notes 66-69. The Martin court stated that "we have found no decision other
than Richman that has held that the lawful sale of a non-defective product can be an ultrahazardous activity." 743 F.2d at 1204. But the gist of the Indiana Harbor decision was
that the shipping (as opposed to the transportation) of a dangerous chemical, an incident of
its sale, could be an ultrahaardous activity-for which liability would rest not on the transporter, but on the party that injected the nondefective but dangerous product into the
stream of commerce.
82 Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147.
82 Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1265 n.43.
84 See part II-B above (notes 58-74 and accompanying text) (arguing that the manufacture and distribution of a consumer product can be classified as an abnormally dangerous
activity).
88 See notes 129-32 and accompanying text below.
88 See notes 118-28 and accompanying text below.
87 See, e.g., Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204; Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1269.
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licly controversial as handguns ought to be left to the legislatures
and not to the courts. 88 The former criticism will be explored in a
later section of this comment.89 In response to the latter, one can
argue that it is precisely because this issue is so controversial that
legislatures have not taken action, choosing instead to leave the
responsibility to the courts.9 0
The commentaries on this issue reiterate the objections raised
by the courts and add several others.9 1 Their approaches range
from a thorough analysis of the six factors of the Second Restatement 92 to a short treatment based on a few particular aspects of
the doctrine.9 3 A major contribution of the commentaries is to refute the claim that the manufacture and distribution of handguns
has no utility,94 a claim stemming conceptually from the products
liability cause of action. 5 In a perfect world, an activity with a net
social cost would continue only if its private benefit exceeded zero.
Assuming the social costs of an activity are measurable, over time
a rational society would tax and regulate the activity, reducing the
See, e.g., Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1912, 1924-27
(1984). See also Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F.Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
: See part III-D-2 below (notes 140-43 and accompanying text).
0 It should be pointed out that some potential legislative program might be even more
efficient than the judicial course advocated in this comment. A legislative solution could be
more detailed and more carefully tailored to the facts of handgun markets. Moreover, it
might be structured to avoid the inevitable costs associated with litigation. Nevertheless, the
strict liability rule is better than the negligence rule that exists today and is within the
general common law power of the courts to apply.
9" See Donald E. Santarelli and Nicholas E. Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 St. Mary's L. J. 471, 498-501
(1983); Note, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1912 (cited in note 88); Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun
Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 830 (1984);
Note, Richman v. Charter Arms, 11 J. Contemp. L. 601 (1985).
92 See Note, 11 J. Contemp. L. at 609-16 (cited in note 91).
3 See Note, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1923-24 (cited in note 88).
" See, e.g., Note, 49 Mo. L. Rev. at 843 (cited in note 91). See also Richman, 571
F.Supp. at 202. Some commentaries point to the jobs created by handgun manufacturers as
part of the utility created by the activity. See, e.g., Santarelli and Calio, 14 St. Mary's L. J.
at 499 (cited in note 91). While the effect of the activity on the direct community is factor
(f) in the Second Restatement's analysis, the utility associated with capital is not unique to
a particular activity over the long run. Jobs and tax dollars lost to one community as a
result of disinvestment eventually will surface elsewhere, and hence from a society's point of
view it is not meaningful to associate such a generic utility with a particular activity.
9" The lack of utility of a product, or more precisely a net disutility of that product,
would render it (or its particular design) unreasonably dangerous under a risk/utility analysis and would result in a manufacturer's strict liability. The manufacturer is actually held
liable, then, for distributing a product with a net disutility to society, a result arguably
reached under traditional negligence principles. This position on the utility of the product
leads to a like position on the utility of the activity of distributing that product, a position
in this case inconsistent with the doctrine of ultrahazardous activities.
8
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private benefit and increasing the net social benefit so that, at a
minimum, there was no net social cost.
Thus, activities with net social costs will not endure. To be
sure, our world is less than perfect, but since the manufacture and
distribution of handguns is a mature industry, and since our government tax and regulatory mechanisms are well-developed, it
would be reasonable to conclude that the manufacture and distribution of handguns produces a net social benefit. This conclusion
does not mean, however, that the activity should continue at any
activity level.
B.

Foreseeability of Harm

Handgun manufacturers and distributors clearly are "but for"
causes of handgun-related injuries since they directly and indirectly put the weapons into the hands of those who pull the triggers.9 6 To hold manufacturers and distributors liable under the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine, however, the law requires
that their actions be "proximate" causes of handgun injuries. The
question of proximate cause in this context is complicated by the
fact that the immediate infliction of handgun injuries is by intervening parties, and often by criminal behavior. But the chief issue
in determining proximate cause is whether the ultimate injury is
foreseeable to the defendant, and handgun manufacturers and distributors certainly can foresee the eventual injuries.
In the first place, the requirement of foreseeability in abnormally dangerous activities cases is modest at best. The Second Restatement stipulates that the rule applies only to those harms
"within the scope of the abnormal risk. '9 7 But it also states that
contributing acts of third persons, animals, and nature do not absolve the enterpriser from responsibility. 8 As to intentional intervention, the Second Restatement expresses no opinion. 9 At least
one court has held that in cases involving ultrahazardous activity,
foreseeability is not even required.10 0
Second, whatever the status of the foreseeability requirement,
See Windle Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10
N. Ky. L. Rev. 41, 47-49 (1982). See also Wright, Rossi, Daly, and Weber-Burdin, eds., U.S.
Department of Justice, Weapons, Crime, and Violence in America (1981).
:7 Second Restatement § 519, comment e.
8 Id. § 522.
.9 Id. (caveat). See also Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206
(Alaska 1978) (holding the criminal acts of thieves in detonating stored explosives foreseeable for purposes of the rule).
100 Davis v. L & W Constr. Co., 176 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1970).
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the weight of authority recognizes that criminal use of handguns is
foreseeable. 101 Intervening misconduct, either intentional or criminal, is not always a bar to civil liability.10 2 "There are . . . situations in which the defendant will be held liable because his affirmative conduct has greatly increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff
through the criminal acts of others.' 0 3 The predominant utility of
handguns stems from the use or threatened use of lethal force: producers intend handguns to injure. Handgun injuries-including
those caused by criminal acts-are the expected, foreseeable, and
recurrent result of marketing handguns. 04 Accordingly, criminal
intervention does not sever the causal chain.
The most forceful judicial statement of this view is the recent
decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Kelley v. R.G.
Industries,Inc. 05s There the court emphasized the foreseeability of
criminal use of the inexpensive small handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials":' 06 "the manufacturer or marketer of a Satur101 See Steven P. Teret and Garen J. Wintemute, Handgun Injuries: The Epidemiologic Evidence for Assessing Legal Responsibility, 6 Hamline L. Rev. 341, 342-45 (1983). But
contrast David T. Hardy, Legal Restrictions of Firearm Ownership as an Answer to Violent
Crime: What was the Question?, 6 Hamline L. Rev. 391, 394-96 (1983) (arguing that there is
no relationship between firearm ownership and violent crime levels). However, once sufficient time has passed to render the current stock of handguns nonoperational, at least one
point on the activity level/injury level curve will be known: at an activity level of zero (i.e.
when there are no handguns in society), there can be no handgun injuries.
102 See Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 201-03 (cited in note 33).
,o'Id. at 203. See, e.g., Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga.App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974)
(landlord not relieved of liability for burglary and arson where tenant had complained of
inadequate lock); Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921) (rape of passenger negligently discharged by railroad in unsafe neighborhood held foreseeable).
104 See, e.g., Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co. of Albany, Inc., 679 F.2d 212, 215-16 (11th
Cir. 1982) (holding that foreseeability of ex-convict murdering his former wife with a handgun was a jury question). See also McLaughlin v. United States, 106 S.Ct. 1677 (1986), in
which the Supreme Court discussed the inherent dangerousness of handguns even when
unloaded:
First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous; the use for
which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one, and the law reasonably may
presume that such an article is always dangerous.. . . In addition, the display of a gun
instills fear in the average citizen; as a consequence, it creates an immediate danger
that a violent response will ensue.
Id. at 1678 (footnotes omitted).
100

304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).

The court restricted its reasoning, and its creation of a new strict liability niche, to
Saturday Night Specials. However, the court need not and should not have limited its treatment of forseeability in this way. Strict liability only for Saturday Night Specials will probably cause their prices to rise well above those of other, better-made handguns. While some
users will no longer buy handguns at all, others will simply switch to the other guns. Only
strict liability for all handguns will achieve the full potential reduction in activity levels and
hence social cost.
100
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day Night Special knows or ought to know that the chief use of the
product is for criminal activity. Such criminal use . . . [is] clearly
foreseeable by the manufacturers and sellers of Saturday Night
' '10
Specials. 7
From an economic point of view, this expansive notion of causation is completely sound. Once an inference of causation is justified, 10 8 calculations of efficiency need be based only upon statistical
correlations between activity and losses. To establish causation,
the economist examines the relationship between handgun manufacture and injury costs at various levels of production and victim
activity and asks only whether the losses saved by a reduction in
manufacturing activity overcome countervailing losses incurred by
inaccurate risk spreading and by changes in victim behavior. 0 9
This perception of causation avoids the problem of spurious correlation by asking not so much whether a particular action produced
a particular result, but rather whether in the future, modification
or reduction of the activity could avoid a particular outcome in a
cost-effective manner. Some correlation will exist between a wide
variety of activities that determine the injury levels and a particular class of injuries, thus constituting causal relationships. But only
a few, if any, will be correlated strongly enough to make a change
in activity welfare-increasing-and only these activities would be
classified as proximate causes. 110 Hence, this definition of proxi107

497 A.2d at 1159.

1o8In many cases, causation cannot be inferred from correlation; for example, stock
returns of two particular issues might be highly correlated but caused by a third factor, such
as underlying economic trends. Because the relationship between supplying handguns to the
market and handgun injuries is sequential and physically dependent, an inference of causation from statistical correlation is justified.
109 See note 23 and accompanying text above.
11 For example, one could attempt to control handgun injuries by making the manufacturer of the steel that constitutes the handgun strictly liable to the victim. Assuming he
cannot discriminate in pricing between steel used for handguns and that used for less risky
purposes, the steel manufacturer will increase the price of steel generally to reflect his costs
of liability, and some reduction in quantity demanded will result. While very little change in
handgun injuries will occur as steel demand adjusts to the new price, much useful steel
consumption is lost and the result is probably a net social loss. Hence, the manufacture of
steel would not be a proximate cause of handgun injuries.
In reality, many activities will be nontrivially correlated to accident costs. The best
solution in this situation is to charge each of the activities its proportionate share of total
injury cost. If allocation is too administratively burdensome, the second-best solution is to
charge the entire amount of injury costs to the activity that has the greatest impact on total
injury cost. This will improve social welfare as long as the correlation is sufficient to be a
proximate cause as previously defined.
For example, in the case of handgun injuries, the prime causal factor could be either the
manufacture of handguns or the manufacture of ammunition. It is an implicit assumption of
this comment that the handgun element outweighs all others that remain in the total cost
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mate cause does not produce infinite causation.""' Since changing
the activities of manufacturers will change the level of handgun
injuries the most, the manufacture and distribution of handguns
can be said to be a proximate cause of handgun injuries under this
definition of causation.
C.

The Restatement Factors Applied

The six factors of the Second Restatement's formulation of
the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine describe situations in
which a risky activity should pay its way regardless of negligence.
Besides the political desire to place liability on the initial creator
of the harm when two nonnegligent parties are involved, strong
economic reasons further support the rule of strict liability.1" The
factors listed in the Second Restatement reflect the underlying
economic policy of controlling the party whose unchecked activity
levels would be most costly.1 13 Each factor is an indicator of cases
in which reducing injurer activity levels through imposing liability
is likely to be more effective in maximizing net social benefits than
is reducing victim activity levels through a rule of negligence.
1. Probability of harm. The first of the six Restatement factors is the existence of a high risk of harm to the person. 4 Although the data regarding the dangerousness of handguns are notoriously imprecise and are open to various interpretations, some
estimates are useful. Approximately 22,000 Americans die annually
from handgun injuries, and the estimated total cost of injuries and
deaths is approximately $20 billion.11 Numbers are not necessary
to justify the commonsense conclusion that handguns are particularly dangerous items-because of their lethal power and because

function once the impact of criminals and victims have been removed. If another element,
say ammunition, outweighed handguns in the total cost function, then the analysis would
dictate that this activity be charged the entire amount. The possibility exists, however, that
it might not be burdensome to allocate the total cost among the remaining significant activities under a scheme of comparative strict liability.
111 In fact, in some situations, no activity may be strongly enough correlated to injuries
to make a general reduction in that activity through liability efficient. In such cases, one
solution would be to fund accident costs by taxing the related activities in proportion to
their correlation.
:2
See Part I-B above (notes 24-29 and accompanying text).
13 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory Of
Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 851, 907-08 (1981).
14 Second Restatement § 520 (a).
15 Turley, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. at 43 (cited in note 96). Note, however, that only about
half of these deaths result from criminal use or accidents; the rest are suicides. See note 1
above.
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they are easily hidden. As demonstrated above, this dangerousness
is causally attributable to the activity of manufacture and
distribution.
2. Magnitude of harm. The second Restatement factor is the
likelihood that the resulting harm will be great. " 6 This factor excludes those activities for which, although the probability of harm
may be high, the likely extent of harm is minor. Handguns clearly
do not fall within this exception, for the typical harm from them is
death or grave physical injury.
In combination, the first two factors isolate those activities
that have a high expected cost-that is, frequency times damage-associated with them. With a high-cost activity, it is likely
that a reduction in activity levels will lead to a significant reduction in total social cost. Therefore, these two factors give a first
approximation of those activities of injurers for which strict liability-compelling reduced levels of the injurer activity-may be
preferable to negligence.
3. Ineffectiveness of due care. The third Restatement factor
is the inability to eliminate risk by-the exercise of due care.11 7 This
factor in part seeks to determine whether a negligence standard
might be sufficient to control injurer activity levels. But more importantly, it helps define a central attribute of an abnormally dangerous activity: that even in the exercise of due care, there still
exists a substantial danger. And indeed, with handguns there is
still a high risk of eventual injury even if manufacturers and distributors are entirely nonnegligent.
4. Uncommon usage. The fourth Restatement factor is the
extent to which activity is not a matter of common usage.11 8 The
inquiry into common usage has been a critical feature of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine since the inception of the Rylands rule." 9 It distinguishes those activities that are abnormal in
the community.
One justification for this factor is the nonreciprocal nature of
the risks imposed by an uncommon activity.120 When the enterpriser carries on an unusual activity, he subjects the community to
risks of a kind and degree that the community does not in turn
16 Second Restatement § 520(b).
117 Id. § 520(c).
118 Id. § 520(d).
" See notes 35-57

and accompanying text above.
See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 537, 543-56, 569-73 (1972).
120
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impose on the enterpriser. When many in the community participate in the activity, they impose on each other the same kinds and
degrees of risks, thus increasing efficiency by assuring that those
who engage in the activity will be forced to bear the activity's costs
as well.
Perhaps a more important basis for excluding common activities from the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine is that an
activity of common usage (e.g., copking or walking across the
street) is less likely to be marginal.1 21 To recall, marginal activity is
activity that an actor would not find worth engaging in if he had to
bear its full costs, but that he would find worth engaging in under
a liability regime that relieved him of the costs of nonnegligent injuries. Unless activity at a given level is marginal, shifting injury
costs to the actor will not reduce his activity, and accident costs
will not decrease. Conversely, activity of common usage is unlikely
to contain a substantial amount of marginal activity, else the loss
from the activity (because of the activity's frequency) would be so
enormous that it could not be tolerated by a society for enough
time to become and remain "common."
In addition, even when a common activity does contain some

Landes and Posner have elaborated on this idea in proposing a reverse "infant industries" hypothesis for determining when an activity is abnormally dangerous. See Landes
and Posner, 15 Ga. L. Rev. at 910-11 (cited in note 113). Their analysis runs as follows:
During the early stages of an innovative activity, there is insufficient information to determine whether the activity produces a net social benefit. If forcing the innovator to internalize all the costs of the activity with the strict liability rule does not drive the innovator out
of business (i.e. reduce activity levels to zero), it is clear that the activity is producing a net
social benefit. At this point the rule of strict liability makes less sense, and negligence
should replace it. Id. at 911. Thus, as an industry matures the hypothesis predicts a movement from strict liability to negligence.
While this hypothesis may cover certain abnormally dangerous activities, activity level
analysis demonstrates the merit of the strict liability rule even in mature industries or activities. It is essential not to confuse activities that are mature with activities that are of common usage. The latter, but not the former, implies widespread participation in the activity.
An industry that survives a trial period under the strict liability rule and graduates to treatment under the negligence rule has proved that its activity produces a net benefit at some
level, but not necessarily at every level. An activity that is not only mature but also widespread has arguably proven more; it may be inferred that the activity produces a net benefit
at very high levels. Only in the latter case can one infer that there is little need in terms of
social cost to control levels of the activity.
For example, blasting is an especially mature activity, and yet even Landes and Posner
admit that because of the relative positions of injurer and victim, blasting is a paradigm
case for strict liability. Id. at 909. See also Correa, 605 P.2d at 459. Damage from crashing
airplanes is another case that merits application of the rule. Even though airplane transportation is a mature industry, there is absolutely nothing a victim can do to alter activity
levels that will reduce the risk of harm from debris that may fall from an airborne plane.
Despite the maturity of an industry, then, strict liability still may be the preferred rule.
12'
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marginal activity, it may be impossible through the relatively
crude device of liability rules to deter the marginal activity without
also deterring much useful activity. Deciding whether or not to act
consumes real resources, and if the decision must be made very
frequently, the costs of decision making might become excessive.
In determining common usage most courts just state whether
an activity "is"or "isnot" of such usage, without undertaking any
factual inquiry. 1 22 The authors of the Second Restatement have
given it more thought, 123 distinguishing, for example, gas and electricity in household pipes and wires, which are of common usage,
from large gas storage tanks and high tension power lines, which
are not of common usage. 2 4 This distinction between the activity
of supplying a commodity and that of using that commodity is
critical. If courts focus not on the specific risk-creating activity,
but instead on the "use" of the products of that activity, all activities in the end can be of common usage. At least one court has
125
already made this error.
The common usage factor in relation to handguns has provoked much discussion in the commentaries. Some of the debate
assumes, simplistically, that merely because there are many handguns in society, their manufacture and distribution must be of
"common usage.' 26 This ignores the fact that despite the widespread proliferation of handguns in society, only a small group of
entities participates in the manufacture and original distribution
of handguns. 127 Although a considerable number of entities partici122 See, e.g., Nelms, 442 F.2d at 1168. But see Luthringer, 31 Cal.2d at 500, 190 P.2d at
8 ("[Cyanide gas] may be used commonly by fumigators, but they are relatively few in number and are engaged in a specialized activity. It is not carried on generally by the public,
. . . nor is its use a common everyday practice. It is not a common usage within the
definition.").
23 "An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great
mass of mankind or by many people in the community. . . . [If] it is not carried on by a
large percentage of the population, .... it is not a matter of common usage." Second Restatement § 520, comment i.
124

Id.

"2' "Gasoline is an article in common usage, and the transportation of it in substantial
quantities upon the public highways is an essential step in the creation and maintenance of
that common usage." Collins v. Liquid Transporters, 262 S.W.2d 382, 382-83 (Ky. 1953).
Were this view correct, blasting, which is essential to the creation of homes and buildings
that are of common usage, would not be an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous
activity.
12' See, for example, Note, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1923 (cited in note 88): "In light of the
fact that approximately two million handguns are sold each year, the manufacture and sale
of handguns are unquestionably of 'common usage.'"
127

See note 6 above.
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pate in the secondary distribution of handguns, 128 there are probably far fewer players in the handgun distribution game than there
are haulers of dangerous substances or contractors who use dynamite. Making and selling handguns is decidedly not a common
activity.
5. Inappropriatenessof location. The fifth Restatement factor is the inappropriateness of the activity to the place in which it
occurs. 1 29 This factor derives from the association with land use
that the doctrine had during its early development, but it more
properly serves the broad function of ensuring that an activity is
classified in its context, not in isolation. 3 0
The prominence of the locational element in the ultrahazardous cases reflects the fact that nearly all activities are in
some way associated with land use, but its purpose is to ensure
consideration of all the factors of a particular activity, including its
surroundings or circumstances. The main idea is risk assessment:
an activity in one situation may not have the same risk features as
that same activity in another situation. Focusing on the totality of
the circumstances, including the locational aspect, may allow an
activity otherwise dangerous to escape the rule; it may also allow
an activity harmless at first glance to come within the rule.
In the case of handgun manufacture and distribution, assessing its risks in the light of all the circumstances cuts strongly in
favor of classifying it as an abnormally dangerous activity. While
the production and distribution processes might not be dangerous
in themselves, they look extremely risky when considered in light
of the easily foreseeable, harmful uses to be made of handguns.' 3 '
Thus the superficial argument, made by some courts, that production is not per se dangerous 13 2 misses the point of the doctrine.
6. Value of the activity. The final Restatement factor is the
particular value the activity has to the community. 13 The most
important purpose of this factor is to exempt activities with large
external benefits-that is, benefits realized by people not engaging
122Id.
," Second Restatement § 520(e).
", Most courts have recognized that analyzing an activity in isolation is inconsistent
with the concept of an abnormally dangerous activity. See, e.g., Bridges v. Kentucky Stone
Co., 425 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. 1981). Location itself need not be a factor in assessing the context
of an activity: "The reasons for imposing absolute liability on those who have created a
grave risk of harm ... are largely independent of considerations of locational appropriateness." Yukon Equip., 585 P.2d at 1211.
See notes 96-107 and accompanying text above.
1
See authorities cited at note 79 above.
13" Second Restatement § 520(f).
:31
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in the activity. While strict liability is useful in reducing harmful
activity through internalizing social costs, it does nothing to promote activity through internalizing social benefits. Activity with
high external social benefits may be reduced below the optimal
level even under a negligence regime; imposing strict liability
would only exacerbate that problem.
One example of the possible application of the community
value exception is when an identifiable region is wholly dependent
on the activities of a particular industry. Although the activities of
the industry may be relatively dangerous, its business may spin off
benefits in employment and wages that (at least in the short run)
would exceed the benefits from the same capital, employed in another activity.134 In such a community, the bearers of risk (traditionally, such risk would be in the production itself) are likely to
be the beneficiaries of the activities that create the risk; hence, a
reciprocity of risk may exist, improving the equity of the
135
situation.
The above scenario, however, does not apply to handgun manufacturers. There is little reciprocity of risk with handguns: since
the production of handguns is not itself risky, and since handguns
flow into the national stream of commerce, the risk of handgun
injury is inflicted on the populace in general, and not particularly
on the employees of handgun manufacturers. While some handguns such as police revolvers may have external benefits, by and
large guns sold to the general public benefit only their owners. 136
In any case, for most private handguns, external benefits produced
are far outweighed by unconsidered external costs, such as fear.
An activity need not satisfy all of the above discussed factors
in order to be found abnormally dangerous:
[T]he factors . . . are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself
. . . and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict
liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of
134 This observation implies that capital markets are not long-run efficient, a proposition this comment does not endorse; therefore the situation in the text would exist only as a
short-run phenomenon.
13I This follows from acceptance of the reciprocity theory laid out in Fletcher, 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 537 (cited in note 120). For a discussion of Fletcher's theory in the context of ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities, see Charles 0. Gregory, Harry Kalven, Jr.,
and Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 502-03 (3d ed. 1977).
"' Indeed, police handguns may not even be an example of external benefit, since taxpayers fund their purchase.
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them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.13 7
The true purpose of these factors, then, is to allow a flexible basis
for internalizing the external costs of a dangerous activity: "The
essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual, either
because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the
1 38
harm that results from it."'
D.

Other Products Distinguished

Many products initially appear indistinguishable analytically
from handguns, in that there is a foreseeable, high risk that they
will cause harm. These products include other firearms, knives, alcohol, automobiles, and tobacco. One might wonder whether the
manufacturers and distributors of these other products will be liable by analogy if the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities is
applied to the manufacturers and distributors of handguns.13 9 Further analysis, however, demonstrates the unique character of handgun manufacturers and their products.
1. Other firearms. Several factors demonstrate that the application of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine is much
more appropriate for handguns than for other firearms. First,
handguns probably create a much greater risk of harm than do
other types of firearms. Because of their concealability and easy
mobility, handguns are more likely to be used by criminals than
are other types of guns; and the basic purpose of handguns is to
harm human beings. In contrast, rifles have other primary purposes such as sport and hunting game, which enhance their community value relative to handguns.
Imposing strict liability against the purchasers and users of
guns other than handguns will meet with more success than imposing strict liability on the purchasers and users of handguns. Placing liability on handgun purchasers and users is unlikely to be effective, because handgun purchasers and users are often criminals
who are unidentifiable or judgment proof. Because of the many
lawful uses of other firearms, simple probabilities would indicate
that purchasers and users of these firearms are less likely to be
criminals, and thus are more readily available to pay the costs of
Second Restatement § 520, comment f.
1' Id.
,' This concern is raised in Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200,
1204 (7th Cir. 1984), and Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985).
'37
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injuries.

2.

Other products. As to other products, strict liability

against tobacco manufacturers is inappropriate because smokers
harm themselves. In the absence of proof of significant involuntary
harm to third parties, the relevant analogy is to handgun owners
injured by their own guns, a class of handgun victims that should
140
not recover.
Automobiles, alcohol, and knives are somewhat harder cases in
that, at least in some situations, they are instrumentalities for uncompensated injuries to third parties. For automobiles, the presence of mandatory insurance in many states reduces the problem
of judgment-proof drivers.' 4 ' Mandatory insurance also reduces injurer activity by raising the effective price of an automobile: the
price is not the sticker in the showroom, but rather the sticker plus
the present value of liability insurance premiums. Second, the automobile industry is important to the national economy and thus
has a high "value to the community," a factor that cuts strongly
against finding it to be an abnormally dangerous activity. The
value of automobiles certainly far outweighs the harm that can be
inflicted through them; unlike many handguns, automobiles are
not made with the express purpose of causing harm. It is important to note that most people injured in automobile accidents
probably own an automobile. But a victim of a handgun injury is
much more likely to be a stranger to the handgun market. Thus, a
reciprocity of benefits exists with automobiles that does not exist
in the case of handguns.
Knives present a closer analogy to handguns since, like handguns, they are often used as weapons by criminals. The first problem with applying strict liability to manufacturers and distributors
of knives is that such activities arguably are of "common usage":
practically any knife can become a weapon, and there are a large
number of manufacturers and distributors of knives. Second, the
risk of harm presented by knives pales in comparison to guns.142
See notes 144-47 and accompanying text below.
See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Annot., tit. 29, § 782 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring proof of
financial responsibility for those drivers expected to be higher risks); N.J. Stat. Annot.
39:6B-1 (West 1973) (requiring automobile insurance for all registered owners of automobiles in New Jersey).
142 A recent federal study showed that 10 percent of cases where criminals were armed
with knives resulted in stabbings, while only 4 percent of cases where criminals were armed
with guns resulted in shootings. The study pointed out the obvious, however: when injuries
did occur, the gun injuries were likely to be more severe, and offenders armed with guns
were much more likely to complete the crime than those armed with other weapons. See
Chicago Tribune § 1, p. 6, col.1 (Jan. 6, 1986). See also Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control
140
4
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Finally, the purchase and use of knives for purposes other than
injury is so pervasive that the risk of harm attributable to any particular sale is negligible compared to the risk attributable to a particular handgun. Hence, for knives there will be neither a high
probability of harm nor a high probability that the harm will be
great.
Alcohol is an interesting case because the foreseeability of alcohol-induced accidental and criminal injury is analogous to that
for handguns. As with knives, however, the common usage exception comes into play, since manufacturing and selling alcohol are
truly ubiquitous activities. In addition, as with knives, the use of
alcohol is so widespread and frequent that its beneficial and pleasurable uses-and hence its value-probably far outweigh the harm
it causes. Although great in absolute terms, injuries attributable to
alcohol, like those for knives and cars, are probably a far smaller
percentage of the dollar value of the activity of merchandising
these consumer goods than are handgun injuries compared to the
value of making and selling handguns.
Imposing liability on alcohol manufacturers and distributors
would also be problematic because all alcohol products can create
virtually the same dangerous effects on the consumers. Although
different alcoholic beverages may taste very different from each
other, and may contain higher or lower proportions of alcohol, all
can eventually make a person drunk. In this way, one alcohol product is an almost perfect substitute for another; this easy substitution will frustrate any attempt to differentiate the market into lowrisk beverages and high-risk beverages. The only change in activity
available is a general reduction in production of all alcoholic
drinks. Moreover, in many (if not most) cases it will be extremely
difficult in practice to discover which brand of alcohol the injurer
had consumed or to implement changes that would make the
brands distinguishable.
Finally, the sale of each of the consumer goods discussed
above may lack a sufficiently strong causal connection to uncompensated third-party injuries. 143 It is hard to imagine a general reduction in the production of cars or knives that would save more
social costs in third party injuries than would be lost in consumer
benefit from everyday purchase and use of these items. Nor do

Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 721 (1968) (concluding that even after
accounting for the substitution of knives for guns in violent crimes, were guns to be eliminated, the reduction in such crimes would be substantial).
,43 See notes 109-11 and accompanying text above.
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these products seem particularly susceptible to selective marketing
or changes in product design that would alleviate costs of injuries
to third parties without diminishing their utility in ordinary use.
Dangerous knife designs such as switch blades and stilettos are already generally illegal, and manufacturers and distributors of defectively designed automobiles are already strictly liable under
products liability doctrine.
In sum, then, the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine is
much more appropriate to handgun manufacturers and distributors than to manufacturers and distributors of other consumer
items such as cars, alcohol, and knives. A sufficient causal connection probably does not exist between the manufacture and distribution of these items and the harm caused by them. Moreover,
they do not meet the requirements of the Second Restatement's
totality of the circumstances test. Thus, the proffered analysis of
liability for handgun manufacture and distribution produces a
carefully limited principle.
E.

The Rule in Operation

1. Who May Sue. The doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities should be applied only when application is consistent with
the economic and legal reasoning of the rule. Thus, it is necessary
to consider how the rule will operate with different classes of handgun victims.
One class of victims consists of owners of handguns injured by
their own guns. For this class, no strict liability action should be
available against the manufacturer. A purchaser or user should be
made to consider the expected cost of having the gun in her house,
and even if a purchaser does not know all the costs of handguns,""
it is reasonable to expect purchasers to be sensitive to the expected
cost of injuries to themselves. 145 Denying an action against the
144

See Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Anal-

ysis, 73 Georgetown L. J. 1437, 1454-55 (1985). The gist of the Note is that because (for a
variety of reasons) purchasers of handguns will underestimate and ignore handgun injury
costs, inefficient purchase decisions result under the negligence rule. The Note argues for
adoption of a strict liability rule solely on the basis of economic efficiency-that is, cost
internalization-independent of any "legal" basis for the rule. Cost internalization alone,
however, may not be a compelling enough reason for adoption of a liability rule.
145 This assumption of risk should apply to both physical and emotional injuries of the
purchaser. For family members injured by the purchased handgun, the purchaser has a
prima facie case of loss of consortium. This cause of action, however, should fail even where
the purchaser has not acted with contributory negligence, since the purchaser is responsible
for the risk that brings about the loss of consortium. But, the victim who has not been
contributorily negligent should be free to proceed against the manufacturer. The manufac-
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manufacturer-for example, by the doctrine of assumption of risk
as recognized by the Second Restatement-internalizes the costs of
the purchasing decision, limiting the potentially costly victim behavior of handgun ownership to its optimal level. Such an exemption from liability is necessary to preserve the benefit of the strict
liability rule in maximizing the utility of both victim and manufacturer activity. 1 46 However, because family members are not necessarily aware of or responsible for the purchase decisions of another
family member, claims for injuries to family members of a gun
47
owner should not be subject to the defense.1
Another class of victims consists of strangers to the handgun
market. The concern here is with the effect of their conduct on
accident frequency and severity. To the extent that strangers are
contributorily negligent, they should be barred from recovery
against manufacturers and distributors.'4 8 But otherwise, these victims merit compensation from manufacturers for their handgun injuries. Admittedly, some conduct of this victim class may be marginal.149 But, for the reasons previously discussed, the marginal
activity of this class is likely to be significantly less costly than the
marginal activity of the manufacturer. 50
Finally, handgun suicides are another important category of
injuries.' 51 In such instances, strict manufacturer liability is most
likely to be inefficient, since victim activity is much more signifi-

turer, however, could have a cause of action for indemnification against the purchaser or
user of the handgun.
48 See part I-A above (notes 7-22 and accompanying text).
147 Similarly, if the presence of the handgun increases the risk that someone else's
handgun will injure the purchaser, then liability should remain on the purchaser. For instance, if an armed burglar and a homeowner engage in gunfire in which the homeowner is
injured, and it is demonstrated that without the homeowner's gunfire the burglar would not
have used the weapon, there should be no recovery against the manufacturer. Presumably,
the purchaser bought the gun for just such an occasion, and therefore he ought to insure
against the possible costs. Under the theory proposed in this comment, if it is more likely
that using a handgun in self-defense will lead to the defender's injury than not, this is
strong (but not conclusive) evidence that the defender's conduct was contributorily negligent for purposes of the rule.
48 For example, walking alone late at night in a crime-ridden neighborhood may qualify in a jury's mind as contributory negligence. However, the jury may decide that it is
reasonable to walk anywhere at any time even if it is more costly than it is worth. Note that
even though the question of what is an abnormally dangerous activity is one for the court,
questions of negligent conduct are for the jury. See Second Restatement § 520, comment 1.
,' An example of this may occur when the victim chooses a route for which the risk of
handgun injury is greater than that incurred by taking an alternative route.
Ilo See notes 24-28 and accompanying text above.
See Turley, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. at 42 (cited in note 96) (citing 1979 statistics of approximately 11,000 suicides, half of all handgun deaths).
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cant in creating the social loss than manufacturer activity. Hence,
suicides fall into the category of contributory negligence and do
not justify compensation within the rule. In sum, then, only injuries from suicides, from bona fide contributory negligence, and to
purchasers from their own purchased guns should remain
uncompensated.
2. Structure of Suits. Forensic studies are able to identify
the handgun responsible for many particular injuries without too
much difficulty. 1 52 In cases where forensic science cannot identify
the make of handgun responsible for an injury, joint and several
liability among all handgun manufacturers is a workable solution,
since there is only a small group of handgun manufacturers. Under
this theory, each manufacturer will attempt to prove that the in15 3
juring bullet could not have been fired from one of its handguns.
Defendant manufacturers that cannot eliminate themselves from
possible responsibility are available to compensate the victim. Of
course, as previously discussed, the manufacturer will then have an
action for indemnity against any intervening tortfeasor such as the
owner or the user of the handgun.
The distributors of the handgun that caused a particular injury often will be more difficult to identify than the manufacturer.
Nor is joint and several liability feasible, since there are so many
distributors. Thus, manufacturer liability may have to suffice when
distributors cannot be identified.
Estimating the cost of liability will generally fall to insurers as
the cost of insuring against this liability becomes a normal busi-'
ness expense. As this expense will no doubt be a significant one for
manufacturers and distributors, they will demand a higher price
for their goods, with a resultant lower level of production. Some
firms may go out of business, and others may eliminate certain
products. All will change the way they do business. There is nothing inherently objectionable about this result; it happens naturally
in an economy that seeks to eliminate an implicit subsidy.
Making distributors liable as well as manufacturers will allow

152 See Julian S. Hatcher, Frank J. Jury, and Jac Weller, Firearms Investigation, Iden-

tification and Evidence (1957); Jack D. and Charles 0. Gunther, The Identification of Firearms (1935).
15 For example, a manufacturer might make only revolvers, while the bullet was shown
to have come from an automatic handgun; or the caliber may be of a size made only by a
few manufacturers. More detailed factors, such as the rotation of the rifling or the number
of grooves and ridges, may further disqualify certain manufacturers. The rule of joint and
several liability gives manufacturers of handguns with low social costs incentives to make
bullets fired from their weapons uniquely identifiable.
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these actors to shift liability by contract to the most efficient estimator of risk.15 In addition, including the entire chain of distribution in the reach of liability will give each downstream firm an incentive to monitor its supplier for solvency with respect to
expected liability claims. Fly-by-night manufacturers will find few
distributors willing to deal in their handguns. A legislative response of mandatory insurance (as with taxicab companies) or of
minimum capital levels (as with insurance companies) is a further
155
solution to the problem of moral hazard.
3. Retroactivity. One of the important practical considerations of applying strict liability to handgun manufacturers and distributors is whether the rule should apply retroactively to handguns extant at the time the new liability rule takes effect.
Manufacturers who sold those handguns presumably did not include in the price the costs they would now be made to bear.
A manufacturer starting production after the new liability rule
became effective would, compared to the preexisting manufacturers, gain a significant advantage over preexisting manufacturers in
that its capital would not be subjected to risks incurred in previous
periods under a different liability regime. Thus the change in liability is too drastic to charge preexisting manufacturers with these
1 56
risks, despite the fact that such risks were arguably foreseeable.
Thus, in order to limit distributional inequities among owners of
manufacturing facilities, and in order to facilitate the transition to
strict liability, courts should not impose strict liability
157
retroactively.
164 This comment does not consider whether there should be contribution between
manufacturers and distributors. In any case, these actors are likely to work this out by
contract.
"5 The risk of moral hazard in firms where the expected liability to tort claimants exceeds capital is not unique to the anticipated structure of the handgun manufacturing industry. Thus, enlisting the aid of the legislature here is simply a general response to a preexisting problem, now identified in a specific industry.
15' The resemblance to asbestos is noteworthy. Had asbestos manufacturers known or
even perceived of the ultimate liability, the price of asbestos would have been considerably
higher, resulting in decreased use and presumably lower social costs.
1M7 This conclusion is consistent with the test for retroactivity set out by the Supreme
Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). Under Chevron, a court must
assess: (1) whether the new decision "establish[ed] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was
not clearly foreshadowed," id. at 106; (2) "'the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retroactive operation will further or retard its operation,'"
id. at 107 (citations omitted); and (3) the respective inequities of retroactive or nonretroactive application, id. Applying the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine to handgun manufacture and distribution (1) establishes a new principle of law, (2) whose purpose would be
retarded if applied retroactively, and (3) which would be inequitable if applied to manufacturers who sold guns before the adoption of the rule. Accordingly, strict liability against
handgun manufacturers and distributors should not be applied retroactively.
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CONCLUSION

The regulation of handguns is an emotional issue, one better
suited for the legislatures than for the courts. This comment, however, is not about regulating handguns; it is about making an activity bear its costs. The tort law has an established mechanism for
imposing these costs in the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities, and the doctrine fits the factual situation of the manufacture and distribution of handguns in modern society. The courts
ought not to interfere where they have no legitimate role, but
neither should they shy away from applying the principles embodied in accepted common law doctrine when legal and economic
analyses compel a result.
Andrew 0. Smith

